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subhobhai943andClaude Opus 5
ecdc5be435
SUB-OS had a syscall table and user GDT descriptors but nothing that could actually leave ring 0: lazybox and the shell run as kernel code, and syscall_handler() was never reachable from a user program. This adds the missing path end to end on x86_64. Address spaces (arch/x86_64/mm/vmspace.c) - The boot page tables identity-map the low 4 GB off PML4[0] and leave the rest empty, so userland is given its own PML4 slot (512 GiB) rather than holes punched in the kernel's 2 MB huge-page map. A process PML4 shares entry 0 with the kernel and privately owns entry 1. - Frames outside the identity map are refused rather than written through an unmapped pointer; lifting that needs a recursive map or a higher-half direct map, which is noted in the file. ELF loader (kernel/elf.c) - Validates ELF64/little-endian/ET_EXEC/machine, bounds-checks every program header against both the image and the user address range, and lays PT_LOAD segments into an address space. Frames arrive zeroed, so .bss is covered. Ring transition (arch/x86_64/cpu/usermode.asm) - user_enter() drops to ring 3 via iretq after scrubbing every GPR, and user_return() unwinds back to it when the process exits, so exec looks like a call that blocks until the program finishes. Syscalls - INT 0x80 installed at DPL 3 with the Linux x86_64 register convention. The process gets its own kernel stack for the trap, because TSS.rsp0 must not point at the stack user_enter() is standing on. - Every user pointer is range-checked before use. The process page tables are still live during a syscall, so without that check a program could pass a kernel address and have write(2) dump kernel text to the console. The new /sbin/init asserts both a wild pointer and a kernel pointer are rejected. - write(2) to stdout/stderr routes through the new console_write(), which reuses printk's routing so output reaches serial and the framebuffer console rather than only the VGA text buffer. Faults - A ring 3 exception now kills that process and reports CR2 instead of panicking the machine. Userland (userland/init/) - /sbin/init is a real freestanding static executable, linked at the user base and embedded in the kernel image by scripts/mkblob.py. It reports its pid, verifies .bss was zeroed and .data is writable, checks the two pointer rejections, and exits. aarch64 and armv8i keep building: the loader and exec path are portable, and those ports get honest vmspace stubs that fail cleanly rather than pretending to run a program with kernel privileges. Verified under QEMU: init loads at 0x80004000a0, reports pid 1, .bss zeroed, .data writable, both bad pointers rejected, and exits 0 back into the shell. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <[email protected]> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_0161Jh7uCEMLYEMNPsjC1LKf
43 lines
1.2 KiB
C
43 lines
1.2 KiB
C
#include <mm/vmspace.h>
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/*
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* Userland address spaces are not wired up on this architecture yet.
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*
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* The ELF loader and exec path are portable, but they need per-process page
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* tables and a ring-3 entry path that only the x86_64 port implements today.
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* These stubs fail cleanly so a userland exec reports "not supported" instead
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* of silently running a program with kernel privileges.
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*/
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vmspace_t* vmspace_create(void) { return NULL; }
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void vmspace_destroy(vmspace_t* vm) { (void)vm; }
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int vmspace_map_page(vmspace_t* vm, uint64_t virt, uint64_t phys, int prot) {
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(void)vm; (void)virt; (void)phys; (void)prot;
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return -1;
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}
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int vmspace_alloc(vmspace_t* vm, uint64_t virt, size_t len, int prot) {
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(void)vm; (void)virt; (void)len; (void)prot;
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return -1;
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}
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int vmspace_write(vmspace_t* vm, uint64_t dst, const void* src, size_t len) {
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(void)vm; (void)dst; (void)src; (void)len;
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return -1;
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}
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uint64_t vmspace_resolve(vmspace_t* vm, uint64_t virt) {
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(void)vm; (void)virt;
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return 0;
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}
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void vmspace_switch(vmspace_t* vm) { (void)vm; }
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bool vmspace_range_ok(vmspace_t* vm, uint64_t virt, size_t len) {
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(void)vm; (void)virt; (void)len;
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return false;
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}
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uint64_t vmspace_resident_pages(vmspace_t* vm) { (void)vm; return 0; }
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