mirror of
https://github.com/subhobhai943/SUB-OS.git
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SUB-OS had a syscall table and user GDT descriptors but nothing that could actually leave ring 0: lazybox and the shell run as kernel code, and syscall_handler() was never reachable from a user program. This adds the missing path end to end on x86_64. Address spaces (arch/x86_64/mm/vmspace.c) - The boot page tables identity-map the low 4 GB off PML4[0] and leave the rest empty, so userland is given its own PML4 slot (512 GiB) rather than holes punched in the kernel's 2 MB huge-page map. A process PML4 shares entry 0 with the kernel and privately owns entry 1. - Frames outside the identity map are refused rather than written through an unmapped pointer; lifting that needs a recursive map or a higher-half direct map, which is noted in the file. ELF loader (kernel/elf.c) - Validates ELF64/little-endian/ET_EXEC/machine, bounds-checks every program header against both the image and the user address range, and lays PT_LOAD segments into an address space. Frames arrive zeroed, so .bss is covered. Ring transition (arch/x86_64/cpu/usermode.asm) - user_enter() drops to ring 3 via iretq after scrubbing every GPR, and user_return() unwinds back to it when the process exits, so exec looks like a call that blocks until the program finishes. Syscalls - INT 0x80 installed at DPL 3 with the Linux x86_64 register convention. The process gets its own kernel stack for the trap, because TSS.rsp0 must not point at the stack user_enter() is standing on. - Every user pointer is range-checked before use. The process page tables are still live during a syscall, so without that check a program could pass a kernel address and have write(2) dump kernel text to the console. The new /sbin/init asserts both a wild pointer and a kernel pointer are rejected. - write(2) to stdout/stderr routes through the new console_write(), which reuses printk's routing so output reaches serial and the framebuffer console rather than only the VGA text buffer. Faults - A ring 3 exception now kills that process and reports CR2 instead of panicking the machine. Userland (userland/init/) - /sbin/init is a real freestanding static executable, linked at the user base and embedded in the kernel image by scripts/mkblob.py. It reports its pid, verifies .bss was zeroed and .data is writable, checks the two pointer rejections, and exits. aarch64 and armv8i keep building: the loader and exec path are portable, and those ports get honest vmspace stubs that fail cleanly rather than pretending to run a program with kernel privileges. Verified under QEMU: init loads at 0x80004000a0, reports pid 1, .bss zeroed, .data writable, both bad pointers rejected, and exits 0 back into the shell. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <[email protected]> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_0161Jh7uCEMLYEMNPsjC1LKf
90 lines
2.0 KiB
NASM
90 lines
2.0 KiB
NASM
[BITS 64]
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default rel
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; Ring 3 entry and exit for SUB-OS.
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;
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; user_enter() does not behave like a normal call: it drops to ring 3 and only
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; comes back when the process leaves through user_return(), which unwinds
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; straight to the frame saved here. From C it therefore looks like a call that
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; blocks until the process exits and then returns its exit code.
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global user_enter
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global user_return
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section .text
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; int64_t user_enter(uint64_t entry /* rdi */, uint64_t user_rsp /* rsi */)
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user_enter:
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cli
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; Preserve the SysV callee-saved set so user_return can rebuild this frame.
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push rbx
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push rbp
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push r12
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push r13
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push r14
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push r15
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mov [kernel_resume_rsp], rsp
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; Ring 3 data selectors: user data descriptor (0x20) with RPL 3.
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mov ax, 0x23
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mov ds, ax
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mov es, ax
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mov fs, ax
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mov gs, ax
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; Build the iretq frame: SS, RSP, RFLAGS, CS, RIP.
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push 0x23 ; SS = user data, RPL 3
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push rsi ; RSP = top of the user stack
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push 0x202 ; RFLAGS with IF set, everything else clear
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push 0x1B ; CS = user code (0x18), RPL 3
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push rdi ; RIP = ELF entry point
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; Do not leak kernel register contents across the privilege boundary.
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xor rax, rax
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xor rbx, rbx
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xor rcx, rcx
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xor rdx, rdx
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xor rsi, rsi
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xor rdi, rdi
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xor rbp, rbp
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xor r8, r8
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xor r9, r9
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xor r10, r10
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xor r11, r11
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xor r12, r12
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xor r13, r13
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xor r14, r14
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xor r15, r15
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iretq
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; void user_return(int64_t status /* rdi */) -- never returns to its caller.
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user_return:
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cli
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mov rsp, [kernel_resume_rsp]
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mov rax, rdi ; becomes user_enter's return value
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; Restore the kernel's own data selectors before touching kernel memory.
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push rax
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mov ax, 0x10
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mov ds, ax
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mov es, ax
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mov fs, ax
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mov gs, ax
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pop rax
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pop r15
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pop r14
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pop r13
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pop r12
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pop rbp
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pop rbx
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sti
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ret
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section .bss
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align 8
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kernel_resume_rsp:
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resq 1
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