Kernel / memory:
- mm/kmalloc.c: fix "Heap: Out of memory" under the GUI. The desktop allocates
three full-screen 32-bit buffers (~11MB) which overflowed the fixed 16MB pool.
The heap now starts at 32MB and grows on demand from the PMM (16MB regions),
with region-safe coalescing (only merges physically adjacent blocks) so growth
never corrupts across separate PMM allocations. Adds heap_get_grow_count().
Build / run:
- Makefile: merge `run-gui` into `run` so `make run` boots into the graphical
desktop; add `run-headless` (serial-only via QEMU_CMD), bump guest RAM to
256M, update .PHONY and help.
Configure:
- scripts/kconfig/menuconfig.py: gate the curses UI behind isatty() on stdin and
stdout so non-interactive `make configure` stops emitting "nocbreak() returned
ERR" and falls cleanly through to the non-interactive writer.
GUI / userland:
- gui/gui_apps.c: rebuild the System Monitor from hardcoded values into live
telemetry -- real heap used/total/free with a colour-shifting bar, a scrolling
heap-utilisation graph, the grow counter, and real PMM RAM figures.
- lazybox `free`: report how many times the heap has grown.
Auth:
- Default login is now SUB / SUB (Kali-style username==password), seeded first
as the primary uid-0 account and set as the logged-in user; root kept for
compatibility. Hardcoded "root" defaults (whoami, su, passwd, ssh, sshd
session) updated to SUB.
Verified: clean build on x86_64/aarch64/armv8i; GUI boots with 0 OOM/0 panic;
auth engine initialises cleanly; `make configure` fallback is clean.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <[email protected]>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01Fh5z6V7nGPbHvqVG5p4CXX
SUB-OS had a syscall table and user GDT descriptors but nothing that could
actually leave ring 0: lazybox and the shell run as kernel code, and
syscall_handler() was never reachable from a user program. This adds the
missing path end to end on x86_64.
Address spaces (arch/x86_64/mm/vmspace.c)
- The boot page tables identity-map the low 4 GB off PML4[0] and leave the
rest empty, so userland is given its own PML4 slot (512 GiB) rather than
holes punched in the kernel's 2 MB huge-page map. A process PML4 shares
entry 0 with the kernel and privately owns entry 1.
- Frames outside the identity map are refused rather than written through an
unmapped pointer; lifting that needs a recursive map or a higher-half
direct map, which is noted in the file.
ELF loader (kernel/elf.c)
- Validates ELF64/little-endian/ET_EXEC/machine, bounds-checks every program
header against both the image and the user address range, and lays PT_LOAD
segments into an address space. Frames arrive zeroed, so .bss is covered.
Ring transition (arch/x86_64/cpu/usermode.asm)
- user_enter() drops to ring 3 via iretq after scrubbing every GPR, and
user_return() unwinds back to it when the process exits, so exec looks like
a call that blocks until the program finishes.
Syscalls
- INT 0x80 installed at DPL 3 with the Linux x86_64 register convention.
The process gets its own kernel stack for the trap, because TSS.rsp0 must
not point at the stack user_enter() is standing on.
- Every user pointer is range-checked before use. The process page tables are
still live during a syscall, so without that check a program could pass a
kernel address and have write(2) dump kernel text to the console. The new
/sbin/init asserts both a wild pointer and a kernel pointer are rejected.
- write(2) to stdout/stderr routes through the new console_write(), which
reuses printk's routing so output reaches serial and the framebuffer
console rather than only the VGA text buffer.
Faults
- A ring 3 exception now kills that process and reports CR2 instead of
panicking the machine.
Userland (userland/init/)
- /sbin/init is a real freestanding static executable, linked at the user
base and embedded in the kernel image by scripts/mkblob.py. It reports its
pid, verifies .bss was zeroed and .data is writable, checks the two pointer
rejections, and exits.
aarch64 and armv8i keep building: the loader and exec path are portable, and
those ports get honest vmspace stubs that fail cleanly rather than pretending
to run a program with kernel privileges.
Verified under QEMU: init loads at 0x80004000a0, reports pid 1, .bss zeroed,
.data writable, both bad pointers rejected, and exits 0 back into the shell.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <[email protected]>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_0161Jh7uCEMLYEMNPsjC1LKf
Expands the kernel-and-TTY core with the primitives the higher layers have
been missing, plus an in-kernel harness that proves they work.
Data structures (lib/):
- rbtree.c: Linux-compatible red-black tree with parent pointers, full
insert/erase rebalancing, in-order iteration and an invariant validator.
- kfifo.c: power-of-two byte ring with free-running indices, so the wrap
path costs one mask instead of a branch per byte.
- hashtable.c: separately-chained table with FNV-1a hashing, string or
u64 keys, and rehash-on-growth at a 3/4 load factor.
Kernel subsystems:
- kernel/wait.c: wait queues and one-shot completion barriers, backed by a
static sleeper pool so a blocking path never re-enters the allocator.
- kernel/futex.c: 32-bucket futex hash with value re-check, requeue, and an
fmutex_t sleeping mutex built on the uncontended-fastpath protocol.
- kernel/rcu.c: tiny RCU with reader nesting, deferred callbacks, kfree_rcu
and rcu_assign_pointer/rcu_dereference publish barriers.
- mm/page_cache.c: write-back block page cache, 4 KB pages indexed by
(device, page), CLOCK second-chance eviction and dirty write-back.
- kernel/ktest.c: KUnit-style harness with 6 built-in suites, 21 cases and
735 assertions covering every subsystem above (all passing under QEMU).
LazyBox userland:
- coreutils.c: sort, uniq, cut, tr, rev, tac, nl, seq, diff, xxd, du,
factor, sum and truncate, reading through the VFS and handling the
zero-length synthetic nodes that procfs and sysfs expose.
- ktest, rcuinfo, futexinfo, waitinfo and pagecache diagnostics applets.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <[email protected]>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01L5yKJT4Wo2cV3rfPrwY5MP
