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subhobhai943andClaude Opus 4.8
a0cd95cdc9
Create docs/CONTRIBUTING.md (build/verify workflow, coding style, kernel gotchas, commit & PR conventions), docs/SECURITY.md (supported versions, private vulnerability reporting, documented caveats), and docs/ROADMAP.md (shipped in v1.0.0 plus near/mid/long-term plans). Add a Documentation and Contributing section to the README pointing at all four docs. Note: used the conventional CONTRIBUTING.md / SECURITY.md filenames (in docs/) so GitHub auto-detects them as community-health files. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <[email protected]> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01Fh5z6V7nGPbHvqVG5p4CXX
96 lines
3.6 KiB
Markdown
96 lines
3.6 KiB
Markdown
<div align="center">
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<img src="../assets/logo_SUB_OS.png" alt="SUB-OS logo" width="140" height="140" />
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# Security Policy
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</div>
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SUB-OS is an from-scratch, research/hobby operating system. It is built to be
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correct and educational, **not** to be deployed as a hardened production system.
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This document explains what is supported, how to report a vulnerability, and the
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security caveats you should know before running it anywhere that matters.
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---
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## Supported versions
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| Version | Codename | Status | Security fixes |
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|---------|----------|--------|----------------|
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| `1.0.0` (`1.0.x`) | Titan | ✅ Current stable | Yes |
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| `0.2.x` / `0.0.x` (alpha/beta) | — | ⚠️ Superseded | No |
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Only the current stable line receives security fixes. Please upgrade to the
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latest [release](https://github.com/subhobhai943/SUB-OS/releases/latest) before
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reporting an issue.
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---
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## Reporting a vulnerability
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**Please do not open a public GitHub issue for a security vulnerability.**
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Instead, report it privately through GitHub's coordinated-disclosure channel:
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1. Go to the repository's **Security** tab →
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**[Report a vulnerability](https://github.com/subhobhai943/SUB-OS/security/advisories/new)**.
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2. This opens a **private security advisory** visible only to you and the
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maintainers.
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3. Include:
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- Affected version / commit SHA and architecture.
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- A description of the class of problem and its impact.
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- Minimal steps or a proof-of-concept that reproduces it.
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- Any suggested remediation, if you have one.
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> Please describe the **class** of problem and its impact rather than publishing
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> a weaponized, step-by-step exploit.
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### What to expect
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- **Acknowledgement:** we aim to confirm receipt within **7 days**.
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- **Assessment:** an initial severity assessment and triage within **14 days**.
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- **Fix & disclosure:** we coordinate a fix and a disclosure timeline with you,
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and credit you in the advisory and release notes (unless you prefer to remain
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anonymous).
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---
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## Known security caveats
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SUB-OS deliberately trades several hardening properties for simplicity and
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readability at this stage. These are **known and documented**, not bugs:
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- **TLS has no certificate verification.** The TLS 1.3 client performs the key
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exchange and AEAD correctly but **does not validate the server certificate
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chain**. Connections are encrypted but **not authenticated** — they are
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trivially MITM-able. Do not use it to protect real secrets.
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- **Default credentials are `SUB` / `SUB`.** Every image ships with the same
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well-known login. Treat any running instance as unauthenticated.
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- **No exploit mitigations yet.** There is no ASLR, no stack canaries in kernel
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space, and W^X is not enforced on every mapping. Some segments load RWX.
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- **Single-user, cooperative trust model.** Isolation between the ring-3 shell
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and the kernel is minimal; the userland is trusted.
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- **Networking is best-effort.** The stack is a from-scratch implementation and
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has not been fuzzed or audited against hostile packets.
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Run SUB-OS in a **VM or emulator (QEMU)**, on isolated networks, and never with
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real credentials or sensitive data.
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---
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## Scope
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In scope for a security report:
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- Memory-safety faults reachable from the network stack, filesystem parsers, or
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the image/crypto codecs.
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- Authentication or privilege-boundary bypasses beyond the documented caveats.
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- Cryptographic implementation errors (e.g. a broken AEAD or key schedule).
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Out of scope (already documented above): the default credentials, the absence
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of TLS certificate verification, and the lack of exploit mitigations.
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---
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Thank you for helping keep SUB-OS and its users safe. 🐉
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